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In the· Supre~e Court.,.· 
·of the ·State of U tab-
... f'": 
. ..~ ... ~ ' 
SALT LAKE TRANSPORTATION C.OM-
P ANY, a corporation, Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 8442 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUS-
. TRIAL COMMISSION OF UT AI-I, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT;· 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
.. ' 
The Salt Lake Transportation Company, a corporation 
with nontransferable franchises from the Utah Public Service 
Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission and Salt Lake 
City to operate taxicabs known as Yellow Cabs in Salt Lake 
City aHd surrounding areas, submitted its first quarter unem-
ployment compensation contribution report showing thereon 
that no wages were reported for its drivers for the month of 
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March. A representative of the Department of Employment 
Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah investigated 
and on June 16, 195 5, determined that the company should 
have reported ((wages" of the drivers and made an order to 
that effect (R 14). The company appealed to the Appeals 
Referee and a hearing was held and a decision rendered on 
September 2, 195 5 (R 44.) The company appealed to the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah within 
the time prescribed by law and the said Board affirmed the 
decision of the Appeals Referee (R 53.) The company then 
appealed to this Court within the time and in the manner pre-
scribed by law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For a number of years the Salt Lake Transportation Com-
pany, operator of Yellow Cabs in Salt Lake City and surround-
ing areas, owned and operated taxicabs, employed drivers on 
a commission basis to operate its cabs, and paid unemployment 
compensation taxes on such wages. On March 1, 195 5, the 
company entered into an arrangement with its drivers whereby 
the drivers paid a daily rental for the cabs (R 10, 21, 22). 
Except for the daily rental, the drivers retained all monies 
collected from passengers carried without any accounting 
therefor to the company (R 26) except that the driver was 
required at the end of each shift to turn in a otrip sheet" 
(R 26) showing, among other things, the total mileage traveled 
during the shift. The trip sheet did not carry an indication 
of the passengers carried or the money collected therefor. 
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In addition to the montes received directly frorn the 
passengers, the drivers are paid directly by the company a com-
mission on the sale of sight-seeing tickets, which amounts to 
10% of the sight-seeing fare (R 3 7). Also the company sells 
coupon books to the general public, and when a driver receives 
coupons in payment of fares, he turns the coupons into the 
company at face value for cash {R 3 7). 
The drivers furnish their own gasoline, which they can 
obtain from the company at a discount, and in addition are 
responsible for damage to cabs up to $50.00 (damage which 
is due to the driver's own negligence) (R 10, 11). The com-
pany provides a garage, makes all repairs on taxicabs, keeps 
the cabs in proper running order including greasing and lubri-
cation, maintains taxicab stands, assigns the drivers to certain 
shifts (R 23), furnishes a telephone and radio dispatching 
service, provides training for new drivers, and carries public 
liability insurance, the effect of which is to hold the· drivers 
harmless for $5,000 to $10,000 public liability, and in addition 
the company maintains $5,000 propery damage insurance (R 10, 
13, and 22). 
Each driver is furnished a 26-page booklet outlining in 
detail the driver's responsibility in representing the o~ganization 
in his contacts with the public, his care of the equipment, use 
and sale of coupon books, commission sales of sight-seeing 
tickets, etc. (R 18). 
The company has a right to terminate the so-called lease 
agreements at any time at the end of any shift when no violation 
has occurred or during any shift when the driver has violated 
operating rules applicable to the drivers of taxicabs · (R 30) . 
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The Utah EmployJ.?ent Security Act provides: 
cc35-4-22 (j) (1) (Erpployment' means any service 
performed prior to January 1, 1941, which was em-
ployment as defined· in the Utah Unemployment Com-
pensation Law prior to the effective date of this act, 
and subject to the other provisions of this subsection, 
. service performed after December 31, 1940, including 
service in interstate commerce, and service as an officer 
of a corporation performed for wages or under any con-
tract of hire written or oral, express or implied." 
( ( 3 5-4-2 2 ( j ) ( 5 ) Services performed by an indi-
vidual for wages or under any contract of hire, written 
or oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to be em-
ployment subject to this act unless· and until it is shown 
to the satisfaction of the Commission that-
( A) such individual has been and will continue to 
be free from control or direction over the per-
formance of such services, both under his con-
tract of hire and in fact; and 
(B) such service is either outside the usual course 
of the business for which such service is per-
formed or that such service is performed out-
side of all the places of business of the enter-
prise for which such service is performed; and 
(C) such individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, 
profession, or business of the same nature as 
that involved in the contract of service." 
({35-4-22 (p) (Wages' means all remuneration for 
personal services, including commissions and bonuses 
and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium 
other than cash. Gratuities customarily received by an 
individual in the course of his employment from per-
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sons other than his employing . uhit !shall be treated as 
wages received from his. employing unit. The reason-
able cash value of remuneration in any medium other 
than cash and the reasonable amount . of gratuities 
shall be estimated and. determined in accordance with 
rules pr~scribed by the Commission; provided7 that the 
term ~wages' shall not in\luqe:" 
~ ~ 3 5-4-10 ( i) . . .' . In any judicial proceeding under 
this section the findings of the Commission and the 
Board of Review as to the facts if supported by evidence 
shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said court 
shall be confined to questions of law . . . . '' 
This Court has many times determined that employment, 
as it is used in the Act, is to be determined by the statutory rules 
alone and not by any common law definition of master and 
servant. In this case we are concerned with two questions: 
(a) Did the taxicab drivers perform services for the Salt Lake 
Transportation Company and (b) were such services performed 
for wages? 
STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
POINT I 
THE TAXI DRIVERS DID PERFORM· PERSONAL 
SERVICES FOR THE PLAINTIFF COMPANY. 
POINT. II 
THE DRIVERS PERFORMED SUCH SERVICES FOR 
, ;• ' I ' - ' 
. WAGES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TAXI DRIVERS DID PERFORM PERSONAL 
SERVICES FOR THE PLAINTIFF COMPANY. 
The decision of the Referee that the taxi drivers were 
performing personal services for the plaintiff company is sup-
ported by the evidence. 
In examining any given situation to determine the rela-
tionship of the parties as to whether such relationship falls 
within the scope of the statutory provisions, we are compelled 
to look beyond the name designation of the relationship to 
its factual substance. The Employment Security Act does not 
specifically define the term ((service." However, this Court 
in a number of cases has interpreted its meaning in the light 
of the statutory language. In the case of Creameries of 
America, Inc. vs. the Industrial Commission of Utah and 
Robert L. Foss, 98 Utah 5 71, 102 P 2d 3{)0, Justice McDonough 
discussed the application of the statutory language to the term 
(Csetvice" at some length. In that case the facts were substan-
tially as follows: 
Creameries of America, Inc., entered into a contract called 
a !(Franchise Agreement" with the defendant Foss, who \Yas 
denominated ndealer" therein, under which contract there was 
granted to Foss the exclusive right to sell the company's prod-
ucts at retail in a defined franchise area in Salt Lake City. 
Under the contract the company agreed to sell such products 
to Foss at a price fixed at a discount from nthe retail price 
posted on the Company's bulletin board," or if no price \vas 
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posted, then at a nreasonable price as determined by the com-
pany for similar products in the same neighborhood.'' The 
company loaned to the dealer a list of names, addresses, and 
requirements of the persons who at the date of the contract 
were purchasing its products at retail within the franchise area. 
The company reserved to itself the good will of the retail 
trade within the area, a provision being made by the agreement 
for the (lpurcfiase" from the dealer, upon the termination of 
the contract, of any customers or business acquired by the 
latter during the life of the contract· after deducting any loss 
thereof suffered during such period. The contract term was 
for one year and ttthereafter from year to year, unless otherwise 
cancelled or terminated.'' The agreement was terminable by 
either party upon giving the other two weeks' written notice. 
The dealer agreed not to handle products other than those of 
the company within the area. Upon the dealer's failure to carry 
out any of the provisions of the contract, the company reserved 
the right to terminate the agreement upon twenty-four hours' 
written notice thereof. The agreement was not assignable with-
out the written consent of the company. 
Foss was required to keep his truck at the company's 
garage and repairs were made thereon by the company and 
charged to the claimant without his knowledge or consent. 
Books of account were supposed to be kept by claimant, which 
books were required to be left at the offices of the company 
unless consent was obtained to ·take them home. The company 
maintained a special bank account for claimant and deposited 
the money collected from customers. The company made nsug-
gestions" and noffered advice" as to how claimant should 
increase sales, make collections, etc. 
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Justice McDonough, in discussing the meaning of the term 
((service" as used_ in the Employment Security Act, stated: 
. " ((Section 19 (p) defines (wages' as (all remuneration 
payable for personal services, including commissions 
and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration ·pay-
able in any medium other than cash.' The term (serv-
ices' and (personal service' used in defining (wages' 
are not specifically defined in the Act. In ordinary 
usage· the term (services' has a· rather broad and general 
meaning. It includes generally any act performed for 
the benefit of another under some arrangement or 
agreement whereby such act was to have been per-
formed. The general definition of (service' as given in 
Webster's New International Dictionary is (perform-
ance of labor for the benefit of another'; (Act or in-
stance of helping, or benefiting'. The term (personal 
service' indicates that the (act' done for the benefit of 
another is done personally by a particular individual. 
cc •••• (Services' then must be given the broader 
meaning hereinabove adverted to. No indication is 
given in the Act that the legislature intended to give a 
restricted meaning to such term. On the contrary the 
way in which (services' or (personal services' appears 
in our Unemployment Compensation Act indicates an 
intention on the part of the legislature to use the term 
in its broad general sense. If such personal services 
are found to have been performed for the employing 
unit, then such service is to be deemed employment 
subject to the Act. But if the facts required by sub-
divisions (a) (b) and (c) of subsection ( j) ( 5) are 
shown to the satisfaction of the commission, the service 
of the individual is not within the terms of the Act; 
otherwise it is. We turn now to a consideration of the 
evidence in this case. 
nit is clear that Foss was performing services for the 
plaintiff. Although by his contract Foss was supposedly 
10 
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(buying' dairy products from plaintiff and (reselling' to 
certain customers, still the · purchasers of the dairy 
products were customers of the company and not of 
the distributor. The customers were receiving plaintiff's 
products through the (distributor.' The plaintiff never 
relinquished its right to those customers, and at the 
termination of a contract with a distributor the com-
pany had a right not only to a list of all old Ct1Stomers 
so that it could continue to supply its products. to them 
through some other distributor, it also had the right 
to purchase for one dollar each the names of any new 
customers obtained by the distributor during his con-
tract with the company. The dealer could acquire no 
customers for himself; though he was entitled to re-
muneration for any he might acquire for the employing 
unit. Certainly the distribution or (reselling' of plain-
tiff's dairy products to plaintiff's customers was per-
forming (services' for plaintiff within the meaning of 
the Act." 
Justice McDonough concluded that: 
((While there is dispute in the evidence as to some of 
the above facts, the evidence in the record clearly dis-
closes that the commission might reasonably have 
found that the claimant was not free from (control' and 
(supervis~on' under his contract with the plaintiff and 
in fact." 
Chief Justice Wolfe in the case of H. L. and Irene Leach, 
dba, Rusco Window Company vs. Board .of Revie:w of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of E~ployment 
Security, 260 P 2d 744, in his discussion as to whether or not 
certain dealers arid installers for the plaintiff were rendering 
services for the plaintiff, referred to Justice McDonough's 
comments in the ~reameries of America, Inc., case~ supra, with 
approved arid said: 
11 
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ccwe find in the record competent evidence from 
which the Board of Review could have reasonably con-
cluded that both the dealers and the installers were 
rendering services for the plaintiffs for cwages' as that 
term is defined in theAct. This court held in Creameries 
of America, Inc. v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 571, 
102 P. 2d 300, that the word c services' while not de-
fined in the Act, should be given a broad meaning. Said 
the court, speaking through Mr. Justice McDonough, 
Cin ordinary usage the term ccservices" has a rather 
broad and general meaning. It includes generally any 
act performed for the benefit of another under some 
arrangement or agreement whereby such act was to 
have been performed.' We further stated that all re-
muneration payable for personal services is (wages.' " 
In the matter of Singer Sewing Machine Company vs. 
the Industrial Commission of Utah et al, 104 Utah 175, 134 
P. 2d 479, this Court laid down a number of rules to which 
the Court was committed in a_pplying the statutory provisions 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, and we quote: 
c (The examination of these opinions reveals that the 
members of this court are committed to the following: 
(a) The unemployment compensation law was en-
acted under and as an exercise of the police power of 
the state. 
(b) Its purpose is remedial to protect the health, 
morals, and welfare of the people by providing a cush-
ion against the shocks and rigors of unemployment. 
(c) Being remedial under the police power and not 
imposing limitations on basic rights, it should be lib-
erally construed. 
(d) 'Employment' under the act is not confined to 
common law concepts, or to the relationship of master 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and servant, but is expanded to embrace all ser·vtces 
rendered for another for wages. 
(e) The terms (employment', (personal services' and 
(wages' are much broader in meaning and application 
than their common law counterparts, and encompass in 
their coverage many persons and relationships not in-
cluded in the common law relationship of master and 
servant. 
(f) All situations where one rendering services for 
another for (wages' is under the direction and control 
of such other in the rendering of such service, are 
service relationships within Sec. 19 (j) ( 1) of the act. 
(g) The absence of direction and control does not 
necessarily exclude the parties, or the relationship from 
the operations or scope of the act. 
(h) In determining if the relationship is within the 
act, the Commission and the court will look behind 
the contract to the· actual situation-the status in which 
the parties are placed by the relationship that exists 
between them. 
( i) The test is twofold: Did he render personal 
service for another? If so, was he entitled to remuner-
ation (wages) therefor? If both are found, the rela-
tionship is within the act. 
(j) If the relationship is. within the act, we apply 
Section 19 (j) ( 5) to determine if he is entitled to 
benefits, provided the claimant meets all other require-
ments of the act to bring him within its provisions. 
(k) Section 19 (j) (5) is an exception or exclusion 
section taking or sifting out from the right to receive 
benefits, certain persons who otherwise come within 
the act, as (rendering personal services for wages' and 
is not a test to determine whether the relationship was 
. '' a serv1ce one. 
13 
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A(ter discussing the relationship. between the Singer Sew-
ing Machine Company and Gorman·· C. Winget, the Court 
concluded::·. 
(<Each of the above terms are inconsistent with the 
concept .. of a vendor.:vendee relationship. The business 
shows it was the Company's goods, the Company's ac-
counts; the Company's risks of profit and loss; the 
Company's money; the Company's customers; the Com-
pany's good will; the Company's salesman. Many of 
the services ·rendered by the salesman were rendered 
at the specific direction of, and for the Company. It was 
a service relationship." 
While Justice Wolfe in the case of Fuller Brush Com-
pany vs. the Industrial Commission of Utah et al, 99 Utah 97, 
104 P. 2d 201, dissented, we think his discussion of the issues. 
and facts to be considered in determining whether or not a 
service relationship exists, reflects th~ thinking of the rna jority 
of the Court and we quote: 
( (But any services for (wages', as (wages' is defined 
by Sec. 19 (p), however small, constitutes a service 
relationship as distinguished from a non-service rela-
tionship. However, it must be a service relationship and 
it must be services performed for wages. A true vendor-
vendee or a lessee-lessor relationship are not service 
relationships. They fall in the non-service category. Not. 
the only test of a vendor-vendee or lessor-lessee rela-
tionship is the contract executed betw~en the· parties. 
This may in words and fornz meet the tests of a vendor-
vendee contract rather than a service contract, but 
facts aliunde of the contract may be taken into con-
sideration to determine the real relationship between 
the parties. And this relationship for purposes ~f de-
termining whether the applicant may participate in 
·· the Fund and whether the other party to the -relation.; 
14 
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ship was· an 'employer'· of the applicarit, must be 
viewed in connection with the Act and the purposes 
which it is to serve. This is not to say that what is 
not a service relationship under tests applicable, had 
this Act never been passed, will become a service re-
lationship because of the Act. What is meant to be said 
is that the Commission and this Court will look behind 
the mere form of the relationship to determine what 
it actually is and not what it is called. If the .relation-
ship was to all intents and purposes one for the ren-
dering of services by one party to another, the fact 
that it may assume the legal habiliments of another 
type of contract will not avail to defeat the applicant's 
right to share in the Fund. This I understand to be 
the real meaning of National Tunnel & Mines v. Ind. 
Com., supra. The Act was meant to cushion unempfoy-
ment treated as an incident to the service relationship 
of employment. This objective was not only for the 
welfare of the individual entitled, but for the benefit 
of society. The individual needing work is in most cases 
required to contract in the manner which ·he vvho has 
the job to offer may desire. And if the net result of 
that contract is to provide what would ordinarily be 
a service performed for him, it will be lo{)ked at in 
fact as indeed it is-as creating a service relationship. 
'C •••• Under an agreement of 'employment' which 
the Company can terminate at will, a (suggestion' or 
'some advice' from a supervisor over a territory in all 
probabili~y constitutes, in effect, an order to a (dealer' 
·who wishes to keep his -territory and to continue to 
sell Fuller brushes. It is also noteworthy that ,the sales 
organization acknowledgingly extended ·down to the 
last ljnk, including · the consumer_ and .. the plaintiff-
that is, the so-called 'dealer'." 
Keeping in mind the· reasoning in the above quoted cases, 
let us examine the situation in the instant case. In· our dis-
15 
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cussion, we would like to make it plain that we ·do not consider 
that the acts of the company in changing its method of operation 
were taken with the intent to evade unemployment compen-
sation taxes. The company representative testified (R 21) that 
the company for some time prior to March 1, 1955, had been 
attempting to obtain an arrangement with Salt Lake City 
whereby taxicab meters would be used with the apparent idea 
that the use thereof would lead to an increase in revenue for 
both the drivers and company. On being convinced that the 
use of the meters was not going to come into existence, the 
company decided, after consultation with the unions and the 
employees, to change their method of operations to one whereby 
the ((driver" ((leased" his taxicab from the company at a 
certain price per shift. The company representative testified 
( R21) : ((The Company was losing money under the commis-
sion and guarantee basis operation and the drivers were making 
comparatively small earnings as represented by their take-home 
checks. And it appeared to us that with the institll:tion of the 
lease method of operation where the driver pays for the gaso-
line factor of expenses and was entirely on his own as to the 
control of his unit on the street that he would do better and 
that the company's operating cost would be less." 
On March 1, employees who formerly were working on a 
commission guarantee basis commenced Hleasing" their taxicabs 
on a shift basis. 
For the purpose of better illustrating the situation, let us 
examine the series of events under which a new inexperienced 
driver enters into his relationship with the company and how 
he operates thereafter. 
16 
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In the first place a new driver is, in all probability, ob-
tained by newspaper or word-of-mouth advertising. He more 
often than not is regularly employed at places other thati the 
Yellow Cab Company (R 24). He may be a University student, 
a school teacher, a shift worker at one of the smelters, a post-
man, or he may have a different occupation. Generally, he is 
an ordinary working man who wishes to increase his other 
income. He meets with the company's ((superintendent of 
taxicabs" and he agrees to ((lease" a cab. He obtains no interest 
in the company's franchise to operate a taxicab business, which 
franchise, is, of course, nontransferable (R 21). He is told 
that it will be necessary for him to obtain his own individual 
licenses, which are required by the state and the city. This 
he does at his own expense. He deposits $15.00 with the com-
pany to insure payment on his daily use of a taxicab, which 
cab, incidentally, is not specifically designated in his contract 
He is then assigned to a company employee who takes him 
on a student training trip (R 28 and 34). On this trip he is 
indoctrinated as to the best methods of operating a taxicab, 
keeping in mind the public interests. He is advised as to the 
use and care of the shortwave radio which is in his cab. He 
is informed as to the various taxi stands and the use of the 
telephone. 
He is given a t•Yellow Cab Drivers Guide," (R 18) which 
starts out on Page 1: (CTo the public you ARE the Yellow Cab. 
You must assume the responsibility of representing the entire 
organization in your contacts with the public-pedes~rians and 
motorists as well as your patrons. It is your aim to have this 
organization take its rightful place among the mo~t reliable 
and responsible businesses in the community ,and the success 
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of this a.tm rests largely with you . · . . In entering into a 
contract- \vith- this company it is taken for granted_ that· you 
are anxious and willing to cooperate with other Y ~How Cab 
driver~: in rendering the best possible service to Yellow Cab 
customers." (This last sentence appears in italics.) (Inci-
dentally, thi$ Driver's Guide was revised effective ··March 1, 
1955.) _ (Italics ours). 
The introductory statement then informs the driver that 
special privileges will be granted to none and ~at the driver 
should operate in a manner which will continue to be a credit 
to himself and to nthis organization." The Guide -then con-
tinues to give _ ((advice'' to the driver as to what the customer 
expects. It then goes on to deal with Special Orders; Starters 
and Dispatchers; Quarreling; Notification; Loading and Un-
loading Passengers; Handling of Complaints; Reporting for 
the Shifts; Shift Rules, including a statement that ot1ertime 
will not be allowed unless previously permitted by the office 
and that drivers will be given regular days o if; Storms; Han-
dling of Baggage; Handling of -Change; Waiting for Custo-
mers; Questionable Loads; Passengers "'ho Refuse to Pay; 
Articles Left in Cab; Soliciting or Influencing Patrons; Drink-
ing~ the Law; Suggested Conduct; Appearance; Change of 
Address; Drivers~ Meetings; Reading the Bulletin Board; 
Drivers' Equipment;- Coupon Books-in connection with these 
books,; it is explained to the drivers that the company sells 
coupon books,· a $5.00 book costing $4.50; Reports; Respon-
sibility; Mechanical Trouble. Then there follows a detailed 
statement of what is expected of the driver in taking care 
of his ·equipfl'lent, how· he shall ·drive, how he shall ·report-
18. 
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accidents, how to operate when empty, and so on covering the 
entire field of service to the general public which is embodied 
in the issuance of the.franchise to the company. 
The Guide explains to the driver that the driver may sell 
sight-seeing tours, upon which he will be paid a commission 
of 10%. It instructs him in the procedures of reporting a sale 
and obtaining the 10% commission from the company. The 
Guide ends with the statement: ((In our company, we have 
always been able to feel pride in the moral caliber of our 
drivers. Through drivers such as yourselves, the standing of 
the taxicab has been recognized to be one of constructive 
citizenship." (Italics ours). 
The driver is then informed that he must file a trip sheet 
(R 10) on forms which are supplied by the company. The 
superintendent of cabs then assigns the driver to a certain shift 
and designates his days off. Each day when he reports for work 
he is required tq accept the one taxicab (of the company's 88 
cabs) which is on that day assigned to him. He can now con-
tinue to drive a taxicab keeping all monies collected from the 
customers, except that which he spends for gasoline and pay-
ment of his shift, and he can so continue until such time as 
he violates a rule applicable to cab drivers or until such time 
as his conduct while driving does not conform to the ((advice" 
which he has been given. Upon any violation the company 
is free to terminate his services at will and to either take the 
taxicab away .. from him during his shift (R 30 and 31) or 
refuse .him the right to "lease" a cab. 
Whenever the company informs him by radio that he is 
to «(report to garage" he is required to do so as soon as possible. 
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The contract specifically requires that the driver personally 
drive the cab and that he permit no other person than ·himself 
to do so. In this connection we would like again to refer to 
the language of Justice McDonough in Creameries of America, 
Inc., supra, in which he states: 
((The term 'personal service' indicates that the 'act' 
done for the benefit of another is done personally by 
a particular individual." 
We would again like to quote in part from Justice Wolfe's 
comments in the Fuller Brush Company Case, supra: 
((The Act was meant to cushion unemployment 
treated as an incident to the service relationship of 
employment. This objective was not only for the wel-
fare of the individual entitled, but for the benefit of 
society. The individual needing work is in most cases 
required to contract in the manner whic_h he who has 
the job to offer may desire. And if the net result of 
that contract is to provide what would ordinarily be 
a service perfonned for him, it will be looked at in 
fact as indeed it is-as creating a service relationship." 
(Italics ours.) 
We submit that the entering into the contract for the 
"leasing" of a taxicab was only the beginning (rather than 
the end result) of a service relationship, the result of which 
is the fulfillment of the conditions of service to the public 
under which the company obtained its franchise to operate as 
a public service business. 
After the driver is given very detailed advice as to how 
he is to operate and perfor1JJ under his contract in order to 
maintain the con1pany standards of operation, statements that 
the con1pany could not require him to do those things carry 
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very little meaning in the light of the overall factual situation. 
A driver in his own mind is well aware of the fact that because 
the company can terminate his relationship at will, the com-
. pany can, in fact, compel him through its nadvice" to do all 
of those things which are necessary in the proper performance 
of driving a taxicab and furnishing cab service to the public. 
Of course he is going to perform in the manner suggested 
by the company because he knows that unless he does, his 
earnings are going to cease. 
The company representative testified that they could not 
require the driver to accept calls. This must be examined in 
the light of subsequent testimony that in order to continue its 
franchise for the operation of taxicabs, it is actually necessary 
to perform the public service for which the franchise was given. 
Since the driver's use of the cab is restricted to the driving 
of the public for fares, the driver is certainly impelled (if he 
is going to obtain anything from the arrangement) to accept 
fares which he picks up himself and which he picks up as a 
result of telephone and r_adio communication from the com-
pany office. The relationship between the company and the 
driver is entirely inconsistent with that of lessor-lessee or 
bailor-bailee. The driver is not subjected to the risks of profit 
and loss as those terms are generally known. His earnings are 
dictated by the amount of nfares" which he carries and the 
money obtained therefor and his costs are fixed and not variable. 
The customers, the risks of profit and loss, . the good will, the 
property, the franchise, the responsibility to the public for 
injuries, and for taxi service are those of the company and 
not of the driver. 
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Counsel for plaintiff has referred to some extent to cases 
decided by the Federal Courts with reference to the subject 
of unetnployment cotnpensation coverage. In the case of 
United States vs. Silk, 331 U.S. at Page 712, 67 S. Ct. at Page 
l467, the Court said: 
((As the Federal Social Security legislation is an attack 
on recognized evils in our national economy, a constrict-
ed interpretation of the phrasing by the courts would 
not comport with its purpose. Such an interpretation 
would only make for a continuance to a considerable de-
gree of the difficulties for which the remedy was devised 
and would invite adroit schemes by some employers and 
employees to a void the immediate burdens at the ex-
pense of the benefits sought by the legislation." 
And in ~aus vs~ Huston (Iowa) 35 F. Supp. 327, wherein the 
facts are substantially the same as in the instant case, the Court 
said: 
((Does the plaintiff engage merely in the leasing of 
taxicabs or as a common carrier of passengers? When 
all factors are considered, and particularly the con-
tractual relationship of the plaintiff with the passen-
gers carried, I think there c:an be little doubt that 
plaintiff is operating the line of taxic_abs, and that 
while he h-as adopted an ingenious method of ·fixing 
the compensation of his drivers and permits the drivers 
to exercise some discretion over the cab during the 
period of the driver's shift, nevertheless I think there 
is no discretion vested in the drivers inconsistent \Yith 
the relation of master and servant. From the very 
nature of the case the drivers, in order to perform their 
duties promptly, must exer_cise very complete control 
over the cabs \vhile they have them on their shifts.'.' 
It \vilL of course, be noted that the language- of the Social 
Security Act defines coverage within the limits of the master-
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servant rule. We would like to point out that the Federal 
courts, prior to the convening of the 80th Congress, had n1ore 
and more been inclined to expand the coverage under the 
Social Security Act thereby including many individuals \vho 
would not normally be included under the employer-employee, 
master-servant rule. As a result of this continued expansion 
by the courts, the Congress apparently did not agree \Vith 
the courts' expansion of coverage and considered it a usurpa-
tion of congressional legislative function and consequently 
the 80th Congress, in its second session, amended the Social 
Security Act, over the President's veto, and specifically limited 
the coverage definition to the common law rule of ((employer-
employee." (Public Law 642, 80th Congress, Second Session, 
Amending Paragraph 1101 (a) ( 6) Social Security Act.) (Sec. 
10 A.L.R. 2d 358.) It is to be expected, therefore, that cases 
which came before the Federal courts after that action by the· 
80th Congress would consider the coverage question in the 
light of the restricted language adopted by the Congress. 
Since the Utah statufe, as has been many times previously 
construed, intends a much broader coverage than that of the 
common law rule of master-servant or employer-employee, 
we think the federal cases (dealing only with the master-
servant rule) carry very little weight in the instant case. We, 
the respondents, are of the view that the circumstances which 
indicate that the taxi drivers in this case are performing 
services tcin employment" outweigh those which may indicate 
otherwise. The Salt Lake Transportation Company owns the 
taxicabs and the necessary operating franchises. lt'has a garage 
where those cabs are housed and serviced, except for gasoline 
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which is paid for by the drivers. It is listed in the telephone 
directory as offering taxicabs for hire, and it employs telephone 
and shortwave radio operators to receive calls for taxicab 
service. The drivers have no investment in equipment and no 
separate business apart from operating the plaintiff's taxicabs. 
They are required to operate their cabs during specified periods 
and on a day to day basis. Periodically the company advises 
the drivers by printed material and otherwise regarding such 
subjects as safe driving, drinking on duty, how to avoid acci-
dents, what to do in case of accidents, what to do with articles 
left in cabs by passengers, etc. If a driver disobeys any of 
these company rules or regulations, the company can refuse 
to permit him to take out or operate a taxicab. 
These circumstances would appear to be the determinative 
factors indicating that these drivers are performing services 
in employment. The business of the company is the operation 
of taxicabs for hire. The drivers' jobs are an integral part of 
that business and not an incident to it. The unlimited right 
of the company to terminate the services of the driver and the 
right of the company to control these drivers as to the hours 
they shall work is sufficient to show an employment relation-
ship \Vithin the n1eaning of the Act. 
In addition to the ((leasing" of taxicabs, the drivers are 
asked to act as company representatives in selling sight-seeing 
tours on the Gray Line busses. For this sales activity the drivers 
are paid in cash by the company a ten per cent commission-
a very definite indication that this is a service relationship. 
While the appellants point out that there are no wages 
going fron1 the company to the drivers, we respectfully call 
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the court's attention to the fact that the company sells coupon 
books and that the drivers accept coupons in payment of 
fares. After accepting such coupons, the drivers then cash 
them in at the company's office thereby receiving 'compensa-
tion for the fare. The appellants indicate that the Departtnent 
of Employment Security would be in a difficult position should 
the ((driver-lessee" be considered within the Act. In reply, we 
would like to point out that the application of the benefit 
provisions of the Act to the (!driver-lessee" would be no dif-
ferent than in the case of individuals working by the hour. 
Any employee has a right to refuse to accept a job when he 
finds that the wage level of the job is not sufficient to satisfy 
him. He also has a right to refuse a job when he considers 
that the working conditions are not to his standards or liking. 
This is equally true in regards to the (!drivers". The Depart-
ment would, of course, look into the situation to see whether 
or not the claimant's unemployment was due to the company's 
refusal to sign a rental agreement or whether or not it was 
due to the claimant's refusal to accept the rental agreement or 
to his having committed some misconduct in connection with 
his work. 
We submit that the relationship between the Salt Lake 
Transportation Company and its drivers was one of service 
within the definition of service laid down by this Court in 
numerous other cases. 
POINT II 
THE DRIVERS PERFORMED SUCH SERVICES FOR 
WAGES. 
The monies received by the driver from passengers as 
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fares (less the amount paid, for the daily shift for the cab 
and the. gasoline cost), the commissions received from the sale 
of sightseeing tours, and the monies received from the com-
pany in return for coupons collected from passengers for 
fares :were all wages within the meaning of the Utah Employ-
ment Security Act and Section 35-4-22 (p) supra. 
In the Creameries of America, Inc., case, supra, the Court 
discussed the meaning of the word c (wages'' and said: 
''That the income received by Foss from the distri-
bution of products for plaintiff comes within the defi-
nition of 'wages' is also evident. All remuneration 
payable for personal services is (wages.' We have just 
concluded that Foss performed (services' for plaintiff 
which. (services' were performed by him personally. 
The retnuneration, therefore, which he received for 
those 'services~ constituted wages. This remuneration 
was the difference between what Foss had to pay the 
company for the products and what he "Tas permitted 
to charge for such products. He was re<1uired to pay 
plaintiff a fixed price for products and the appeal 
tribunal might reasonably find from the evidence that 
, as a matter of fact the retail sale price \Yas fixed by plain-
tiff. The difference bet\veen those prices constituted his 
'commission.' '' 
In the Fuller Brush Company case, supra, the Court dis-
cussed the definition of c 'wages'' at some length and said: 
. ' 
''But it is not al.l personal service performed for an-
. other 'that con1es \\·ithin the Act, but only such as is per-
forn1ed 'for \vages, or under a contract of hire.' 'Wages' 
is defined as all compensation payable for personal 
services, rendered for another under a contract of hjre, 
' ' 
express or in1plied. This compensation is based upon 
and con1puted upon service rendered, and is not derived 
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from the accomplishment of a purpose or ach_ievement 
of an objective, by the person receiving the remunera-
tion, through a difference in two prices. The essential 
elements of wages are that they form a direct obliga-
tion against the employer, in favor of the ern,ployee; 
that when the service is performed the com2ensation, 
if any, accrues and becomes payable regardless of the 
success or failure of the undertaking; that any profits 
or earning over and above costs of the service accrues 
to the en1ployer, and any loss as a result of the under-
taking or service must be borne by the em player. It is 
essential that the wage move directly franz the enz-
ployer to the enzployee, as tvhere the employee works 
on commissions, deducts his cotnmission franz a col-
lection and remits the r nets/ but it is essential that the 
remuneration accrues from the product or service of 
th·e employer, and would accrue to him except for the 
fact that the employee is entitled to t'etain or receiue 
it as remuneration under his contract of hire. The terrn 
r contract of hire' is not defined in the Act probably 
because the legislature felt that the expression u•as so 
well established, understood and definite, that it needs 
no further amplification or exposition. It is used in its 
common meaning and acceptation. It is an aKreement 
whereby one undertakes or obligates himself to rendet' 
personal service for another for a remuneration to be 
paid because the service was rendered, regardless of 
the element of profit or loss resulting from the U'ork, 
endeavor, or undertaking." (Italics ours.) 
We cannot agree that the entire risk of profit and loss from 
the operation of the cabs is solely and exclusively that of the 
drivers. The driver's sole risk of loss is that during any one 
shift he may collect passenger fares in an amount less than his 
shift payment and the cost of his gasoline. The primary risk 
of profit and loss lies with the company. It is obvious that the 
company, in determining t~e amount of monies which were to 
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be retnitted by the drivers to the company, took into consi~era­
tion the company's cost of operating telephone and radio 
service, the payment of personnel in handling the company's 
business, including supervision and the salary of the super:-
intendent of taxicabs; the cost of public liability insurance; 
the cost of the garage where the taxicabs were housed; the 
cost of cab repairs and the cost of any public liability payments 
over and above the amount of insurance; and the general up-
keep of taxicabs and other equipment. 
On the other hand the driver had no investment in equip-
ment or services. If he didn't carry passengers, naturally he 
used very little, if any, gasoline. 
The success or failure of the undertaking is dependent 
not so much upon the ability of the driver to carry a sufficient 
number of passengers, but upon the ability of the company to 
obtain passengers through its advertising and telephone list-
ings and through the company's ability to keep the drivers 
informed as to available passengers. It is true that the driver's 
net ren1uneration fluctuates in accordance with the number of 
passenger fares he collects just as it is true in the case of the 
con1mission salesm~n who furnishes his own car and gasoline 
expenses. The commission salesma_n in that case retains as 
wages the difference between his costs and the total commis-
sions earned. In the instant case, the Department representa-
tive followed the practice which was followed by other juris-
dictions, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue. See Michi-
gan Cab Company vs. Kavanaugh, 82 F. Supp. 486. In that 
case, on the failure of the company to collect the social security 
tax, the Collector of Internal Revenue assigned.._ a deputy 
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collector to prepare and file a tax return for the plaintiff com-
pany. After interviewing three of the plaintiff's drivers and 
examining plaintiff's books and records as to the hours worked, 
the examiner estimated the average earnings of plaintiff's 
drivers to be $6.00 per day. The assessment was then based on 
the estimate obtained as a result of the investigation. 
In the instant case, the Department representative followed 
substantially the same procedures. The appellants argue that 
since the drivers are not accountable to the plaintiff for the 
fares they collect, then the plaintiff is not in a position to 
determine the wages of the drivers so that it can pay the un-
employment compensation tax. It occurs to us that the exact 
earnings of the drivers might well be obtained by requiring 
the drivers to enter the amounts received on the ((trip sheets" 
which they are compelled to file with the company. 
As to the amounts which are received by the drivers as 
commission for the sale of Gray Line tours, the company al-
ready has that information. The company is also in possession 
of information as to the amounts paid to drivers by the com-
pany in redeeming coupons which the drivers receive as fares. 
In substance, the instant case falls squarely within the 
purview of the decision of this Court in the Creameries of 
America, Inc., the Fuller Brush Company, and the Rusco 
Window Company cases, all supra. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit that the Appeals Referee reason-
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ably concluded from the evidence in this matter that the drivers 
who ((lease" cabs from the Salt Lake Transportation Company 
were performing services for wages within the meani~e of the 
Utah Employment Security Act. · 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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